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Participatory Welfare in South Korea :  
Meaning and Issues 
 
Raymond K. H. Chan1 
 
Abstract 
 
‘Participatory Welfare’ is the term coined by the current Roh 
Moo-hyun government to distinguish its welfare reform from the 
previous Kim Dae-jung government’s ‘Productive Welfare’ policies. 
While the use of term ‘participatory’ is a convenient extension of its 
slogan ‘Participatory Government’, the details of Participatory 
Welfare are still evolving and results have yet to be seen. Observed 
from the documents and policies proposed or implemented so far, it 
has two key dimensions: promoting ‘participation’ and building up 
of a ‘welfare community’. The reforms are located in a context of 
civil society calling for greater participation and reforms in an 
increasingly polarized society. Besides continuing the reforms 
initiated by the previous government, new and strengthened 
emphasis has been put on promoting welfare rights and 
redistributions, fostering gender equality and inclusion, and the 
citizen’s participation in the provision and management of welfare 
services. Yet, it also emphasizes the traditional view of individual 
and community responsibility. The reforms are both progressive and 
conservative in nature and are still to be subjected to reality’s test. 
The reforms are facing challenges from the opposition – political 
parties, traditional elites, bureaucracy, capitalists and even the trade 
                                                 
1 Associate Professor in the Department of Applied Social Studies at City 
University, Hong Kong. This paper, which was initially presented at the Korea 
Workshop, hosted by the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan University, Hong 
Kong, in April 2005, draws on the comments of Prof. Kim Sang-kyun (SNU), Prof. 
Kim Yeon-myung (Chung Ang U) and Prof. Lee Hye-kyung (Yonsei U) in personal 
interviews conducted in November 2004, and their contributions should be 
acknowledged.  
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unions. It is doubtful whether the community and individuals are so 
ready to take up the expected roles and duties.  
Welfare Development in Korea 
 
Kwon Huck-ju has described Korea’s welfare system before 
the financial crisis as following welfare developmentalism. 
Economic development was the overwhelming concern of the 
contemporary Korea welfare state, taking priority over social 
protection (1999, 2002).  Major features of the system have 
been a strong regulatory system, low public expenditure, and 
limited income redistribution with a strong emphasis on the 
informal sector’s contribution. Kwon criticizes such 
developmental model as having at least three problems: 
 
a) the lion’s share of the resources went to the high income 
earners and the chaebols (business conglomerates) 
reflecting an increasingly unequal society; 
b) social policy making was confined to a small number of 
top-level policy makers, with low accountability and 
transparency; 
c) public welfare system mainly catered for the regular 
workers (waged and salary earners), leaving behind the 
irregular and unemployed workers with nominal welfare 
protection (2002). 
 
Responding to the Financial Crisis, President Kim Dae-jung 
launched ‘Productive Welfare’ in 1999. Influenced by the 
‘Third Way’ concept, this policy placed greater emphasis on 
welfare as an effective instrument to improve economic 
productivity and, in addition to protection, to enhance Korea’s 
competitiveness in the global market (Presidential Office, 
2000). He argued that this approach was different from the 
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past as it recognized the social rights to a decent living for 
every citizen and acknowledged the state responsibility for 
delivering that goal. During his time in office, Kim reformed 
and extended the coverage the National Pension System 
(NPS) 2 , integrated the National Health Insurance (NHI), 
expanded the coverage of Employment Insurance System to 
smaller sized firms (EIS) and introduced the Minimum Living 
Standard Guarantee (MLSG).  Productive Welfare policies 
sought to achieve an integrated balance between economic 
growth and social protection. It adopted policies which 
expand the state’s role and welfare right, but at the same time, 
it also introduced the elements of neo-liberal reforms (e.g. 
flexible labour market, welfare to work and workfare) (Chan, 
2003; Kim Y H, 2003).  
 
The overall response to Productive Welfare reforms was 
positive. Lee comments that ‘for the first time in Korean 
history, welfare reforms came to be appreciated as an 
institutional means to keep democracy and market economy 
sustainable’ and placed in the mainstream political discourses 
and national policy agenda (2004:293). Civil society has 
actively participated in shaping the agenda and policy (e.g. in 
Maternity Protection Scheme and National Basic Livelihood 
Security Act) (Lee H K, 2004: 297). Policies have reduced 
status segmentation with stronger emphasis on redistribution 
and universalism (Kim Y M, 2001, 2005). The reformed 
pension and insurance schemes show a strong sense of 
solidarity and national scale of risk diffusion and income 
redistribution within and between generations (Kim Y M & 
Kim K S, 2005). Kwon argues that with these reforms, Korea 
                                                 
2  Note that Kim also proposed to reduce the replacement ratio so as to maintain the 
financial sustainability of the scheme.  
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has gradually moved beyond developmental model with 
improved accountability (2003).  
 
Context for Participatory Welfare 
 
Nevertheless, problems of transparency, efficiency, high 
stratification effects between regular and irregular workers, 
inadequate protection of the poor, and inadequate welfare 
services for children and the family are still there (Kim Y M, 
2001, 2005).3 These probably constitute the contextual factor 
of Participatory Welfare, which is to address the demand for 
wider participation in policy making and to tackle social 
problems accumulated for decades.  
 
The issue of social polarization has caught much attention, 
partly as a result of the liberalization reform under the 
Productive Welfare. Polarization can be reflected in widening 
income gap (and different benefits received from the social 
security system) between regular and irregular workers, 
between workers in large-sized companies (e.g., chaebols) and 
small and medium-sized enterprises SMEs, and between 
income classes.  
 
Currently, 50 per cent of the waged earners are irregular 
workers in Korea. The number of temporary and daily 
workers increased by 19.6% from 1997 to 20024 (Ministry of 
Labor, 2003). The number of elementary occupations has also 
increased by 18.8%5 from 1998 to 2004. The regular workers 
are the insiders who are more powerful in influencing their 
                                                 
3  Korea’s welfare system has higher percentage of compulsory and voluntary 
enterprise-based welfare, with a strong emphasis on familialism (e.g. high 
redistribution between generations).  
4  6,122,000 in 1997 to 7,319,000 in 2002.  
5  2.07 million in 1998 to 2.46 million in the second quarter of 2004. 
 5
employment conditions than the outsiders – the irregular 
workers (Bank of Korea, 2005). These are the results of the 
neo-liberal flexible labor market reforms from the 1990s (Chan, 
2003; Kim C K, 2004).   
 
Wages in large companies are far better than for those 
employed in small companies. In August 2003, the wage gap 
between temporary and permanent employees in large firms 
and SMEs was 48.6% and 52.0%, respectively (the overall gap 
was 48.6%) (Lee B H, 2005). The wage gap between companies 
with 500 workers or more and those with 30 workers or less 
increased from 1.4 times in 1995 to 1.6 times in 2002. Bonuses 
and severance pays of non-regular workers were, respectively, 
31.7% and 44.1% of those of regular workers in the 2002 
Workplace Panel Survey by the Korea Labor Institute 
(Ministry of Labor, 2003).  
 
The Gini coefficient measurement in Korea demonstrates there 
has been a widening income inequality since 1990s. Though 
the figures provided by the Report of Income and Expenditure 
Trends of Urban Salary and Waged Earners’ Households (RIE) 
are not that alarming, the results of the National Survey of 
Household Income and Expenditures (NSIE), which include 
the data of those irregular workers such as self-employed, 
unemployed and single-person households, reflects a more 
worrying trend (see Table 1). Kim Sang-kyun warns that the 
income gap will be further widened if the calculation includes 
the assets of different income classes. He comments that on an 
ideological level, Koreans are concerned with the issues of 
social justice, equality and protecting the disadvantaged; and 
redistribution is a proper means to achieve these objectives. 
 
 6
Table 1: Gini Coefficient, 1995 - 2001 
Gini Coefficient Year 
RIE NSIE 
1995 .284 .332 
1996 .291 -- 
1997 .283 -- 
1998 .316 -- 
1999 .320 -- 
2000 .317 -- 
2001 .319 .389 
Source: Yoo & Kim, 2002 
 
Generally speaking, lower and lower middle income classes 
have suffered more since the Financial Crisis of 1997-98. While 
middle and upper-middle income class are not so affected, the 
high income class actually increased in numbers, which 
reflects a trend of growing income polarization. These trends 
are also ‘inherently destructive’ to social sustainability (Kim C 
K, 2004).  
 
The coefficient of regional variation also increased from 0.15 
in 1993 to 0.255 in 2001. Seoul, Gyeonggi and cities like Busan, 
Incheon and Daegu record the lowest incidence of poverty, 
while provinces in the South-east and Southwest (i.e., 
Jeonnam, Jeonbuk, Gyeongbuk and Gyeonnam) record the 
highest. Though this may not entirely due to favouritism (it 
could have mainly resulted from comparative advantage), it is 
an issue which has been manipulated by the politics of power 
elites to mobilize regional sentiments, and so such a 
phenomenon cannot be neglected by Roh’s government (Kim 
W B, 2003:680).  
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Participatory Welfare can also be understood as a natural 
response to the growing demands for participation; to balance 
elite-bureaucrat domination in policy making and improve 
accountability and transparency. Both Kim Snag-kyun and 
Kim Yeon-myung agree that Participatory Welfare is more or 
less an extended part of the Roh’s participatory political 
reforms. Even Participatory Welfare can be simply interpreted 
as a political-administrative terminology.   
 
During the presidential election campaign in 2002, Roh used 
Participatory Government as his slogan and pledged to put an 
end to the old politics (i.e., conservatism, regionalism, 
cronyism, factionalism, confrontational conflicts and 
corruption) and vowed to build up a new society and era of 
politics in Korea which emphasised pan-national cohesion, 
true participatory democracy, clean and people-centred 
government. He claimed that the government is ‘of the 
people’ wherein the people can participate in all government 
affairs (Soon H C, 2004:47).  
 
His election campaign also resorted to such participatory 
strategies. For example, the Millennium Democratic Party 
(MDP) introduced primaries for presidential-candidate 
nominations and separated presidential power from the party, 
which lead to a more modern party image. Approximately 1.8 
million voters participated in the party primaries that selected 
35,000 delegates. The primaries further enhanced the MDP’s 
reformist image by selecting Roh Moo-hyun, a person with a 
reform bent and populist image, rather than the famous 
frontrunner, Rhee In-je (Hoon J, 2003).  
 
In the 2002 presidential election, liberal voters increased to 
41.1% (compared to 32.7% in 1992), while conservative and 
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moderate voters declined to 26.7% and 32.3% respectively 
(compared to 40.3% and 41.9% in 1992). About 70% of the 
younger voters consider themselves as liberal, while older 
adults (aged 40 to 49) are tilted toward conservatism (Hoon J, 
2003). Roh’s political platform tapped into the beliefs and 
desires of these demands for reforms, especially from an 
increasingly active younger generation in Korea (Larsen, 2003). 
No matter whether the government truly sponsors these or 
not, it has to respond to such calls.  
 
Participatory strategies are also responding to the increasing 
influence of civil society in Korea. During the 1990s the civil 
society movement gradually shifted from concerns over class 
and political conflicts to the promotion of the common good 
of society. Civil society became more committed to the 
promote public interest in a wider variety of topics, in the 
process of consolidation of democratization (Lee C H, 
2004:57).  
 
Participatory Welfare Reforms 
 
Kim Yeon-myung observes that the term Participatory 
Welfare was only adopted after Participatory Government 
was selected as the election campaign slogan. So this is not a 
well-planned policy initially, but something that gradually 
evolved in the process. The welfare part of it is more or less a 
continuation of the previous policies with the addition of new 
measures to promote equality, inclusion and greater 
protection, especially for those groups which are considered 
to have been neglected previously, such as women, elderly, 
children and irregular workers. Kim Sang-kyun argues that 
creating a new term reflects Roh’s desire to have his own 
distinctive policy platform, which can also help to respond to 
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the sentiment against rapid welfare expansion under the 
Productive Welfare period.  
 
When Roh won the election, the government announced 
twelve policy goals which included amongst them to ‘improve 
participatory welfare and quality of life’. Objectives under this 
goal are to ‘develop a full-fledged national health care system’, 
‘promote national welfare with focus on guaranteeing 
minimum livelihood, childcare, and support for senior 
citizens and the handicapped’ and ‘create a prosperous and 
stable society’. Other related policy goals include fostering a 
society of balanced development between economic growth 
and distribution, different regions, different classes, labour 
and management; and to promote sustainable development 
and gender equality.   
 
In May 2003, Roh established the Participatory Welfare 
Planning Group to study the details of the reforms. In January 
2004, the Planning Group released the five years’ plan on 
participatory welfare, with more concrete policy areas, actions 
and outcomes proposed for the government to consider.  
 
The paper describes the vision of this policy as: 
 
1. to create a healthier, wealthier and more pleasant society 
where the state spearheads the efforts to satisfy the basic 
demands in public health, welfare, habitation, environment 
and culture; 
2. to allow everyone to take part in decisions and enjoy the 
services desired by the public.  
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Six major policy objectives have been proposed in that policy 
paper, which are more or less the same as the previous 
announcements6:  
1. Establish a health insurance system that safeguards 
people's health throughout their lives [MOHW];  
2. Actualize ‘welfare for all Koreans’, in which not only the 
needy but also the elderly, the disabled, women and 
children can feel the benefits [MOHW];  
3. Enhance sovereign competitiveness by solving childcare 
problems and expanding social participation of women 
[MOHW & MOGE];  
4. Create a society with no worries about housing by 
stabilizing the housing prices and improving residential 
welfare [MOCT];  
5. Build a sustainable ‘green’ nation through coexistence of 
environment and economy, and harmony between 
development and preservation [MOE]  
6. Improve quality of life through cultural welfare, a basic 
right for the people [MCT]. 
Apart from the conventional core concerns of welfare policies 
(i.e., items 1 to 3), the policy expands to incorporates housing 
policy, sustainable development and cultural welfare. The 
latest information on the Participatory Welfare policies can be 
found in the publication, ‘Dynamic Korea: A Nation on the 
Move’ edited by Korea Development Institute and Ministry of 
Finance and Economy published in June 2004.  
 
                                                 
6  Relevant ministries are listed in brackets after each policy. MOHW is Ministry of 
Health and Welfare; MOGE is Ministry for Gender Equality [renamed as Ministry of 
Gender Equality and Family in 2005]; MOCT is Ministry of Construction and 
Transport; MCT is Ministry of Culture & Tourism; MOE is Ministry of Environment. 
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Echoing its context, the strategies of Participatory Welfare can 
be broadly divided into two dimensions: ‘participatory’ 
policies and ‘welfare’ policies. The document states that 
Productive Welfare still considers welfare as in conflict with 
growth while the government gave priority to growth.  
Based on their ideological belief and analysis of the social 
conditions, Roh’s government aims to build up an ‘advanced 
democratic nation’ with an efficient ‘welfare community state’ 
overcoming the deficits of the past centralized and limited 
welfare system (KDI & MOFE, 2004:312).  
 
Comparing with the previous Productive Welfare policy, the 
current government suggests that participatory welfare has its 
particular distinctiveness: 
 
Table 2: Comparison between Productive and Participatory Welfare 
Ideas of Productive Welfare Ideas of Participatory Welfare 
Pursue a welfare state through 
expansion of public welfare 
Pursue a welfare community state 
through participation of citizens (P) 
Recognize growth and economic 
preferentialism based on the 
relationship between growth and 
distribution, and between economy 
and welfare 
Recognize harmonious relations 
between growth and distribution, 
and between economy and welfare 
(W)  
Denotative expansion of welfare Strengthen the efficiency and 
systematic functioning of welfare 
(W / P) 
Lack a coordination system for 
social conflicts caused by the 
process of preparing for the welfare 
system 
Establish a democratic coordination 
system for social conflicts through 
active participation of citizens (P) 
Source: KDI & MOFE, 2004:314  
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‘Welfare community state’ seems to be a new term in Korea, 
described as,  
The universal welfare system covers all members of 
society (including individuals, private organizations, and 
the government) participate to establish a social safety net 
and welfare system as well as to contribute to economic 
growth and distribution. In addition, society equally 
shares the achievements and benefits so that all members 
of society will together pursue national development and 
social stability (KDI & MOFE, 2004:312). 
 
In this welfare community, a ‘three-fold layered social safety 
net’ will be built up by the individuals (and families), 
communities (neighbours, religion, charity, social welfare, and 
private organizations) and nation (government). In this 
construction, individuals (and families) have to work to be 
self-supportive, contribute to the social insurance schemes and 
the nation’s social safety net. The community will deliver its 
obligation to support individuals in need and the nations in 
providing welfare.  The nation will strengthen the social 
safety net, independent from individuals and communities, 
ensure the provision of basic medical, housing, education and 
living support to all people irrespective of their income, and 
play a leading role in expanding citizen’s participation in 
community activities.  Such welfare community is managed 
by better coordination, systematization, connection, 
mobilization and integration among the private welfare 
networks in the communities which are currently dispersed in 
communities; and with public welfare system (KDI & MOFE, 
2004:312-313).  
 
In this welfare regime, ‘participation’ can be referred as 
individuals and communities participating in ‘providing’ and 
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‘managing’ welfare to those in need, which are, in fact, 
constructed as their obligations (KDI & MOFE, 2004:313). 
Participation also means fostering the participation of 
excluded social groups to be re-included into mainstream 
social and work life by social policy and legislation. So, 
Participatory Welfare, on one hand, represents a further 
consolidation of the notions of citizens’ rights for welfare, and 
state’s roles in providing welfare provisions. However, on 
another hand, the policy also re-emphasizes the traditional 
family and individual’s roles, which is more or less the same 
as the conventional construct of the so-called East Asian 
Welfare Model.  
 
Major welfare policies proposed or introduced include (KDI & 
MOFE, 2004) include:  
 
1. Social security system: 
1.1 Social assistance: improve National Basic Livelihood 
Security System (such as selection criteria and asset 
check, efficiency, benefit level). Expected to have more 
beneficiaries: 1.38 million in 2003 to 1.6-1.8 million in 
2008.  
1.2 National Health Insurance: increase contributions and 
reduce out-of-pocket payments, increase coverage 
especially for the poor through medical care scheme, 
activate supplementary private insurance and 
planning of Long Term Care insurance. 
1.3 National Pension Scheme: strengthen the financial 
sustainability by increasing the contribution rate 
(increase from 9% by 1.38% in every 5 years from 2010, 
to 15.9% until 2030, reduce income replacement rate 
from 60% to 50% by 2008, synergy with private 
pension). 
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1.4 Employment Insurance System: extend coverage to 
casual workers working less than a month, workers 
working at least 15 hours per week and newly 
employed workers aged 60 or older are also included 
from January 2004. 
1.5 Rationalise the management: including collection of 
tax and levy for pension, health insurance and EIS 
contribution, curb under-report and non-report of 
income.  
 
2. Social welfare services:  
2.1  Improve the efficiency of social service delivery 
system and to network community resources, 
establish Community Welfare Councils in cities and 
provinces starting from 2005 and pilot social welfare 
office under local governments to increase efficiency, 
and to solicit / coordinate community resources. 
2.2 Improve and increase child care services by 
government’s investment, and require large sized 
private companies to provide that services by 
legislation. 
2.3 Aging society challenges: greater attention to address 
the needs and problems arising from rapid aging 
society, and proposes measures to stabilize child birth 
rate, family-work balance policies, and work for the 
elderly. 
 
3. Promoting gender equality and preventing discrimination:  
3.1 establish a fair and transparent system under the 
principle of equal opportunity, and new mechanism, 
such as Gender Discrimination Improvement 
Commission and National Human Rights 
Commission. 
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3.2  introducing global standards to Korean society 
 
4. Labour policy: 
The current government continues the previous social 
investment strategies on human capital formation, and 
employment services to targeted groups (such as women, 
the aged, the disabled, non-regular workers and 
low-income earners). Public work programmes continued 
to provide mainly social service jobs for the marginal 
labour groups. Flexible labour market reforms were also 
continued (KOIS, 2003; Ministry of Labor, 2003; 2004). 
 
4.1 Promoting Aged Employment: expand the list of 
occupations listed in the Aged Employment Promotion 
Act preferentially assigned to the age, from 70 
categories to 160 categories (70 and 90 in public and 
private sectors respectively) in June 2003. In July the 
same year, the government differentiated the standard 
employment ratio of the aged into 2% for 
manufacturing; 6% for real estates, renting and leasing; 
6% for transportation and 3% for others instead of 
applying the same ratio of 3% to all industries. 
4.2 Foreign worker permit system adopted in 2005 to 
protect the foreign workers and the facilitate SMEs to 
recruit workers. 
4.3 Employment conditions: National Assembly passed 
the five-day workweek bill on 29 August 2003 after a 
three-year long debate between labour and 
management. Minimum wage: The minimum wage 
applicable from September 1, 2003 to August 31, 2004 
is 2,510 won per hour (20,080 won for a standard 
8-hour work day). 
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4.4 Irregular workers: prepare legislation for better 
protection of irregular workers (as the bill also calls for 
greater flexibility for employment, it has been strongly 
questioned by Korean trade union movement). 
4.5 Labour relations: gradually adopted a tougher 
approach to handle industrial disputes, management 
will have greater power in layoffs and better protection 
against walkouts, no work no pay principles will be 
enforced during illegal strike/walkout, disciplinary 
measures against unruly behaviour (such as 
occupation of facilities, blocking entrance to offices, 
interfering with operations of non-unionists and 
actions of violence, destruction and blackmailing).  
 
‘Participatory’ is in line with the Roh’s government’s national 
agenda to enhance participatory politics to ‘shift toward an 
open and decentralized governing structure to create a new 
political and social environment that can ensure proper and 
responsible practices in politics’ (KDI & MOFE, 2004: 28).  
Apart from the previous policies which aimed to promote 
people or organizations’ participation in the provision, 
management and planning of services, this dimension also has 
three major strategies:  
 
1. creating a participatory political and social environment 
by measures such as online system for recommending 
candidates for government positions and institutional 
improvements, town hall meetings to discuss and make 
recommendations on public official candidacies (also 
applied to  government-affiliated organizations and 
public corporations);  
2.  promoting participation of minority groups in decision 
making and high ranking posts, e.g. women and disabled;  
 17
3.  decentralization of power to local development which will 
also mitigate regional imbalance (KDI & MOFE, 2004; 
Kang M G, 2003).  
 
Issues of Participatory Welfare 
 
The progress of Participatory Welfare reform did not have a 
smooth start. The policies were caught by conflicting interests 
and ideological positions. The reforms received strong 
resentment from those whose interests are being affected 
adversely - the opposition party (e.g. Grand National Party, 
GNP), bureaucrats, media, and even the trade unions. The 
major challenge to it was the political conflicts or even turmoil 
in the first one and a half years of Roh’s government, which 
over-flowed into this domain.   
 
The GNP certainly takes a very critical stance on the reforms. 
The two parties (the GNP and the MDP) have different 
opinions on social policies issues, for example, in the priorities 
of growth-oriented or redistribution-oriented, and in pension 
reforms.  
 
If the government represents the liberal strand, arguing for 
greater redistribution, the opposition camp represents the 
conservative strand, protecting the long-standing social 
structure and values. As shown in the above, Roh’s 
government represents and reflects a ‘new tide of ideological 
competition, the 20/30 generation, and voluntary 
participation ‘which has replaced the ‘old order of regionalism, 
personal charisma, and closed party politics’.   
 
Roh’s government has adopted a series of ‘new’ and perhaps 
‘unusual’ participatory policies that are unconventional in 
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Korea’s politics and as such are not well received by the 
opposition. Occasionally, Roh has had to make compromises. 
As a result, the initial stage of the reform was a sort of trial 
and error, and therefore conducted in a stop-and-go manner, 
even if not u-turns.  
 
Larsen observes that Roh’s government has no connection to 
the traditional elites which hindered him from promoting his 
agenda (Larsen, 2003). The transition committee for the new 
government excluded bureaucrats and was staffed by mainly 
relatively young and reform-oriented academics. According to 
Kim Yeon-myung, the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare (MOHW) did not even prefer the term 
‘Participatory Welfare’ and rejected the ideas of streamlining 
the administrative structures (i.e., a more flexible resources 
allocation system which would assign money to local 
government, instead of through the Ministry, to enhance 
efficiency and local autonomous) and by that weaken the 
Ministry’s power, especially in the allocation of resources.  
 
On another hand, Roh tried to accommodate the opposition 
even at the very beginning of his office. For example, the 
appointment of Goh Kun, a career bureaucrat as prime 
minister, and the looking for advice on international relations 
and economic policies from other bureaucrats, signified that 
Roh has tried to seek a balance (Hoon J, 2003). Nevertheless, 
he was not successful in achieving such a balance and conflicts 
stepped up.  
 
Major media, such as Chosun Ilbo, Dong-A Ilbo and 
Joong-Ang Ilbo, do not support the government. At one time, 
Roh heavily criticized the press for misinterpreting his policies 
and being hostile to the government. The situation came as 
 19
‘pure principles of the campaign are tested severely by the 
rough and tumble of actual governance; conflict with an 
increasingly aggressive South Korea media’ (Larsen, 2003). 
 
Before mid-2004, the parties supporting Roh was actually a 
minority in the National Assembly. Mobilizing societal 
support is an alternative for counteracting attacks. It is natural 
for critics to see the government as governed by populism (i.e., 
government is tempted to go outside the legal system and 
deal directly with the people when they encounter an 
obstacles in reform), and brainwashing people into ‘believing 
that only change and reform are right while tradition and 
custom are wrong … progressiveness is good and 
conservatism is bad’ (Moon C K, 2004:12). They also criticized 
the government for an over-emphasis on direct democracy 
which might only intensify the conflict between the 
participants and the parliament, especially when the 
parliament and even the new government are not experienced 
enough to tackle such a level of participation, dynamism and 
dilemmas (Hoon J, 2003; Lee C H, 2004:76).  
 
The reforms are also challenged by the needs of balancing 
protection / redistribution and flexibility / growth, just as in 
Kim Dae-jung’s time (Lee H Y, 2004). The way that the 
government handles labour disputes is a good example. Trade 
unions are complaining the government is increasingly siding 
with capital and therefore deviating from Roh’s initial 
sympathetic attitude on legal and even illegal strikes. For 
example, in the illegal strikes case of Doosan Heavy Industry 
and Cargo Drivers Alliance, Roh expressed that ‘a proper 
industrial relations cannot be established if the legitimate 
demands are disregards just because the strike may have been 
illegal’. The worsening economic climate in late 2003 and 
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political scandals have provided opportunities for the 
opposite parties’ ‘disciplining’ of the government.  
 
Since late 2003, Roh has expressed his view that efforts by 
trade unions to shape the government can never be tolerated. 
He publicly criticized and complained about union movement, 
for example, in the cases of ChoHung Bank, new Free 
Economic Zone Act, railway workers union strikes and 
Hyundai Motors. He went on to question the moral and 
ethical standards of the trade union leaders. The government’s 
tough position on the labour movement has led to pro-capital 
labour relations practices from 2004 (Lee W B, 2003, Ministry 
of Labor, 2004). 
 
The Roh government also has had to face up to the problems 
inherent in the existing welfare systems. For example, the task 
to design a Long-Term Care Insurance, reforming the pension 
and National Health Insurance in view of the aging society, 
the issues of sustainability of pension and health insurance 
schemes. Any reform which asks for more contributions will 
certainly raise concerns from the payers, and especially from 
the employers who have to pay for their regular employees. 
There are also debates about whether the government should 
continue to reduce the replacement level and out-of-pocket 
medical expenses, and the calls for improving efficiency and 
accuracy of income reporting and fund management of the 
major social security schemes (Kim Y M & Kim K S, 2005).   
 
The idea of a welfare community state is very much 
ideologically-driven, without a comprehensive assessment of 
the various sectors capacity to participate. The concern over 
family capacity to take care of the increasing burden is a good 
example. Undoubtedly Korea is facing an aging society. More 
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problematic is that it comes at a time when demographic 
trends are actually undermining the family capacity to care: 
smaller family, lesser children, increasing divorce (e.g. crude 
divorce rate is 3.0 in 2000), more women going out to work 
and, hence, fewer people ready to give care. In 2000, 82% of 
the family was nuclear family with an average family size of 
3.1. Percentage of three-generation household has declined 
from 23.2% in 1970 to 10.1% in 2000. In 2001, 17.3% of the 
elderly were living alone (Shin & Shaw, 2003).  
 
Kim Yeon-myung argues that the Korean family is still 
influenced by Confucian concepts and is still willing to 
uphold the family mutual obligations, but that it is already 
taking up too many responsibilities that are beyond its 
capacity. The family at the same time is burdened by 
increasing spending in education and housing costs, and may 
find it difficult to take care of the older generation. 
Concerning the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), he 
comments that they are not ready to participate in welfare 
provision due to limited resources, their primary nature as 
advocacy type organizations and therefore inexperienced in 
providing welfare services. The public are also not ready, 
either apathetic or lacking the capacity, to participate in the 
daily operation and management of services, as prescribed in 
the welfare community state construct.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Compared to Productive Welfare, Participatory Welfare has 
greater emphasis on the participatory side, echoing the theme 
of the Participatory Government. Participatory Welfare 
policies themselves are not merely concerned with welfare 
alone, but are in essence a social and political reform. The 
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emphasis on participation is an appropriate response to the 
call for wider democracy. The strategies, if succeeded, can also 
help to address the problems of a lack of accountability and 
transparency.  
 
In the past few years, welfare reform has been overwhelmed 
by political disputes. Welfare reforms themselves have also 
led to the debates over the issues of redistribution of benefits 
and costs. Improvements in social welfare services to fill the 
gap are still on the way. While we cannot expect significant 
achievement in just two or three years, the results achieved so 
far are still limited.   
 
The government itself is working to strike a balance among 
different demands and social sectors. While addressing the 
needs of reforms and participation, it has to take care of the 
interests of traditional elites, bureaucrats and chaebols’ 
interest. This is more critical when the current government 
cannot enjoy a majority in the National Assembly and the 
President only has low popularity. The progress so far is not 
significant, and except for the expansion of current services, 
participation is still far from true. 
 
At this stage, the success of Participatory Welfare not only 
depends on how much resources the government is willing to 
invest, or how it tackles the problems inherited in the welfare 
systems, but also, and perhaps more important, on its tactics 
to mediate conflicting interests in a society which is 
increasingly mobilized.  
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